EXPOSING LEAHY’S LEGACY OF LIES: Week of Dec. 16
EXPOSING LEAHY’S LEGACY OF LIES — Part 2
SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER
Quotations from the Air Force’s official records of the F-35 Burlington Basing Selection Process
Introductory Statement:
“We are here to read to you a quotation from the Air Force official administrative record of the F-35 Burlington basing selection process and to get your response to it.”
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Concluding Statement:
“We request that Senator Leahy initiate an independent investigation into the political corruption of the F-35 Burlington basing selection process.”
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Day 39: Monday, December 16, 2019
On October 31, 2013, Mr Penland, the Headquarters Air Force chief of Operational Basing wrote to Mr Chupein, an official in Headquarters Air Force Operations expressing concern about the implication in selecting a base that they knew was not suitable for the F-35.
“We need to think hard before picking Burlington!” (Admin Record #64401)
On November 14, 2013, Mr Germanos, the Air Combat Command F-35 Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Basing Program Manager, sent an email to Mr Thies, an official at Air Combat Command Installation office. He wanted to make Thies aware that the reasons given in the Record of Decision for selecting Burlington were incorrect, and that the facts from the EIS process showed that McEntire—not Burlington — was best suited to base the F-35. Germanos states that the facts do not support selecting Burlington and that he cannot come up with any words to justify the decision to select Burlington. He says that if there is another (non-environmental) reason to select Burlington, such as military judgment, then that should be clearly stated. He explains that Burlington should not be selected because there are huge negative environmental impacts to the area, including the fact that a large number of people in the Burlington area will be negatively impacted by the noise of the F-35.
“I have no other proposed language that would justify Burlington AGS. However, if military judgment is the reasoning, the AF should plainly say so, and that it overcomes the much higher magnitude of environmental effects at Burlington AGS, which are not mentioned in the draft ROD [Record of Decision].” (Admin Record #65108)
Day 40: Tuesday December 17, 2019
On November 14, 2013, Mr Germanos, the Air Combat Command (ACC) F-35 Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Basing Program Manager, wrote to Mr Thies, an official at Air Combat Command saying that some of the statements in the Record of Decision used to justify the choice of Burlington are inaccurate, and that other statements are misleading. He also states that he, as the F-35 EIS Program Manager, could not recommend to his bosses that they select Burlington because the data does not support Burlington.
“I wish to go on record as stating that … I, if requested, would not recommend that A7 [Installations office] provide topline coordination to ACC/A8 [strategic planning and programming office] for the F-35A Ops 3 ROD [Record of Decision]. My reasoning stems from the statement regarding Burlington presenting “the best mix of infrastructure, airspace, and overall cost to the Air Force.” This statement is inaccurate; and the statements concerning Burlington having joint training opportunities and a successful active association are misleading, implying that these factors only apply to Burlington AGS.” (Admin Record # 65108)
Day 41: Wednesday December 18, 2019
On November 19, 2013, Major Nichols, in Headquarters Air Force Congressional Appropriations Liaison office, wrote to Mr Pohlmeier, the Chief of Headquarters Air Force Strategic Basing Division. He expressed his disappointment that the Air Force (AF) Action Officers (AO) were unable to adequately convey conflicting information to their senior officers about the Burlington basing. The dilemma for Major Nichols, who was a Congressional liaison, was maintaining good relations with the Congressional delegation (CODEL). They wanted the F-35 based in Vermont; but Nichols knew that the evidence from the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) indicated the F-35 should not be based in Vermont. Senator Leahy seemed unconcerned about the impacts to Vermonters as reported in the EIS. He also seemed unconcerned that the Air Force might be sued for selecting Burlington. Nichols seems conflicted trying to satisfy what Leahy wanted, and also needing to tell the senior heads of the Air Force—specifically the 4-star general Chief of Staff and the civilian Secretary of the Air Force — that what Leahy wanted was not supported by the EIS.
“If I may vent a little, I too am disappointed but more so in our ability to communicate a consistent message as an AF. Either way the decision goes down, this is going to be bad. Litigation or Congressional scrutiny, each have their own pros/cons. The Secretary has been briefed now 3 times on the issues and I firmly believe he knows exactly what he wants/needs to say today to Sen Leahy irrespective of what’s in the prep paper. As an AO caught in the middle trying to relay messaging from multiple offices, all of which are not in agreement on the way forward is not an easy task. Appreciate your patience with me and most importantly our office’s responsibility to make sure we don’t sever important relationships with CODELs and our Top 2.” (Admin Record #65331)
Day 42: Thursday December 19, 2019
On November 20, 2013, Mr Bush, an official from Headquarters Air Force Installations office, wrote to Ms Stefanek from Headquarters Air Force Public Affairs office. He spoke about his office’s inability to explain why the Air Force chose Burlington considering that the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) data shows that more people in Burlington would be affected by the F-35 noise than at the other two Air Guard Stations (AGS) being considered. Other entries from the Air Force Administrative Record showed that it was the corrupt political influence of Senator Leahy that forced the Air Force to make a deeply flawed decision.
“A7C [Air Force installations office] cannot answer the question, ‘Why did the Air Force choose Burlington AGS when the EIS clearly showed more people would be affected by the noise of the F-35?’ The information was in the EIS and the EIS is used to inform the decision maker… Only the decision maker can answer this question.” (Admin Record #65344)
Day 43: Friday December 20, 2019
The following quotations are excerpts taken from the past 42 days of quotes
On March 28, 2013, a Memorandum for the Record was written to capture information discussed during a telephone conversation among senior officials from the offices of the Secretary of the Air Force, Headquarters Air Force, and Air Combat Command on the findings from the F-35 Environmental Impact Statement. In that memo, they wrote that Air Force officials
“discussed the contents of the preliminary draft Record of Decision, which states that the environmentally preferred alternatives are Hill AFB and McEntire ANG Base…. Due to the overwhelming evidence provided by the EIS documentation, {the Air Force officers} proposed the Record of Decision recommendation to be structured around Hill and McEntire….” (Admin Record #57838)
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In a March 28, 2013 Memorandum for the Record, Air Force officials state that critical errors were made in scoring Burlington—specifically that Burlington received a falsely high score in the area of encroachment, meaning buildings in the noise zone. In that memo, they stated that Air Force
“leadership indicated that there is no operational benefit of Burlington ANG base over McEntire ANG base, and that Burlington scored higher than McEntire overall due to incorrect scoring (Burlington scored higher than it should have been and McEntire was scored lower than it should have been regarding encroachment and development) during the initial enterprise wide look.” (Admin Record #57838)
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The following, written in March 2013, is from the “Draft Review Document of the Environmentally Preferred Alternative.”
“Basis of Decision: While the EIS has, by overwhelming evidence, proven McEntire ANG to be the environmentally preferred alternative, Burlington AGS was previously identified as the preferred alternative. The EIS team is unable to craft justification language or rationale to continue supporting Burlington as the preferred alternative.” (Admin Record #57909)
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On December 10, 2010, an unidentified Air Force pilot wrote the following to Mr Penland, the Headquarters Air Force chief of Operational Basing:
“HAHA! But the toughest part of this exercise is for anyone with integrity is that it IS a freakin’ loud aircraft! The only aircraft I have ever flown formation with that I can hear from route position. (Now…forget I said that, and delete this email, and empty your trash. And the double-secret network trash cache, too!)”
That same day, Mr Penland commented on this pilot’s remarks to Col Spacy in the Headquarters Air Force Legislative Liaison office:
“Just so you know I’m not the only one who thinks this is an issue!! This is from someone who had flown with them.” (Admin Record #46447)
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On September 11, 2013, Mr Dryden, an official at Headquarters Air Force Installation office wrote to Mr Germanos, the F-35 Burlington Basing EIS Project Manager exclaiming
“Why would you think that the noise at Burlington can be addressed with mitigation? Outside purchase and relocation of those affected, I don’t know what could be done. The results of the EIS indicates Burlington is the wrong answer of all the alternatives.” (Admin Record #62486)
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On October 22, 2012, Ms Engelman, an official from the Headquarters Air Force Noise/Encroachment Management office, wrote to Mr Penland, the Headquarters Air Force chief of Operational Basing criticizing the Vermont Air National Guard claims about how they propose to fly the F-35. She stated
“Is the Guard willing to conduct all their training with less than full tanks, does anyone understand consumption of this aircraft. (e.g. F22 gets 20 minutes without external stores when not in super cruise). …have the guard folks ever flown their entire training sortie in the simulator (which, oh wait, they don’t know what it is til later on)…? How will taking off with less than full fuel effect training efficiencies and need for refueling during the training? Seems like to me there are other questions than the noise. If we go down this route then the whole … argument that we have to train like we fight goes out the window. When will Guard pilots get experience using full afterburners if they don’t do it at their home base. …are we willing to not train like we fight just to fit aircraft in a place when there are “reasonable alternatives“ for that location.” (Admin Record #55754)